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The	Brexit	vote	was	driven	by	the	losers	of
globalisation,	but	that’s	hardly	the	whole	story
On	the	second	anniversary	of	the	Brexit	vote,	there	is	hardly	any	further	clarity	on	how	a	whole	host
of	issues	will	be	resolved.	Some	say	we	are	in	what	Gramsci	called	“interregnum”	–	a	period	of
uncertainty	during	which	the	old	system	or	order	is	dying	and	the	new	has	yet	to	emerge.
Below,	Armine	Ishkanian	(LSE)	discusses	the	social	context	of	Brexit,	the	reasons	why	people
voted	for	it,	and	asks	what’s	the	role	of	social	policy	going	forward.
The	context,	and	who	voted	for	Brexit?
In	2011,	three	years	after	the	2008	financial	crisis,	we	saw	an	explosion	of	protest	movements	throughout	the	globe.
Many	people	writing	about	these	recent	movements	argue	that	the	protests	and	occupation	of	squares	beginning	in
2011	were	an	expression	of	anger	and	reflected	the	growing	concerns	around	the	lack	of	democracy,	social	justice
and	dignity.	Seven	years	on,	it	has	now	become	clear	that	the	prospects	for	activists’	demands	bleeding	into	the
transformation	of	society	and	of	political	decision-making	are	very	bleak.	Instead,	in	the	intervening	years,	nativist
and	right-wing	populist	movements	have	been	on	a	rising	trajectory,	based	at	least	in	part	on	very	similar	sentiments
of	discontent	with	electoral	politics	and	neoliberal	policies.
Brexit,	similarly	to	Donald	Trump’s	victory	in	the	2016	US	presidential	elections,	is	frequently	interpreted	as	a
manifestation	or	a	result	of	the	growing	anger	with	the	political	and	economic	status	quo	and	a	victory	for	populism.
Regardless	of	whether	we	consider	Brexit	a	form	of	populist	politics	or	simply	a	specific	political	issue	or	demand,
Brexit,	similarly	to	many	recent	protest	movements,	had	a	heterogeneous	base	of	supporters	and	it	became	a
touchstone	for	a	diverse	set	of	grievances	and	special	interests.	And	yet	most	analyses	of	Brexit	tend	to	overlook	this
heterogeneous	base	of	supporters,	and	it	is	common	to	read	interpretations	claiming	that	Brexit	was	largely	a	victory
for	those	left-behind	by	globalisation,	who	lashed	out	in	anger	against	the	current	political	elites	and	wider
system	and	believe	has	impoverished	them.
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In	addition	to	those	so-called	losers	of	globalisation,	Brexit	supporters	included	many	so-called	economic	winners,
including	those	with	high	educational	qualifications	and	incomes.	Nick	Clegg,	the	former	leader	of	the	Liberal
Democrats,	writes	of	elite	Brexiteers	as	“…the	hedge-fund	managers	for	whom	EU-wide	regulations	are	an
overburdensome	[sic]	hindrance	to	their	financial	aspirations”.		Investigative	reporting	by	openDemocracy	has	shed
light	on	the	“dark	money”	funding	Vote	Leave	and	one	of	the	biggest	donors,	Arron	Banks,	who	gave	more	than	£8m
to	the	campaign.	There	are	many	unanswered	questions	about	the	source	of	Banks’	funds	and	possible	foreign
interference.	Since	the	2016	referendum,	there	has	been	a	bevvy	of	post-mortem	reports	which	have	attempted	to
answer	who	voted	for	Brexit	and	why.	These	reports	seem	to	generally	agree	that	the	Brexit	vote	was	largely	driven
by	the	so-called	losers	of	globalisation,	who	are	living	on	the	margins	of	society,	on	low	incomes,	with	few
educational	qualifications,		and	without	the	skills	required	to	prosper	in	the	modern	economy.	They	argue	that	certain
cultural	attitudes,	including	social	conservatism	and	right-wing	views	and	a	very	strong	sense	of	English	identity,	also
predisposed	people	towards	Leave.	But	that’s	hardly	the	whole	story.
Alongside	the	so-called	left-behind	and	the	financial	elites	that	supported	Brexit,	there	is	also	a	group	of	Brexit
supporters	on	the	political	left,	the	Lexiteers.	Lexiteers	by	and	large	reject	the	xenophobic	anti-immigration
arguments	which	they	ascribe	to	the	right-wing	“big	business”	and	“little-Englander”	Leave	campaigns	arguing
instead	that	their	opposition	to	the	EU	is	based	on	socialist	principles	and	on	advancing	workers’	rights	and	anti-
racist	policies.	Lexiteers	maintain	that	the	referendum	has	broken	the	neoliberal	consensus	and	alerted	the
establishment	to	the	polling	power	of	the	“left	behind”.	However,	it	is	highly	questionable	as	to	whether	the	neoliberal
consensus	has	been	broken	and	whether	post-Brexit	Britain	will	veer	away	from	the	neoliberal	policies	which	have
been	embraced	by	successive	governments	since	Thatcher.
Moreover,	what	is	often	ignored	in	the	discussions	about	the	so-called	winners	and	losers	of	globalisation	is	that
many	of	the	people	who	are	now	protesting	in	the	streets,	not	necessarily	for	Brexit,	and	often	against	it,	are	people
who	in	recent	years	would	have	been	described	themselves	as	the	winners	of	globalisation.	Thus,	it	is	important	to
keep	in	mind	that	the	category	“left-behind”	is	a	fluid	and	not	a	static	category	and	even	those	who	may	have	in	the
past	been	described	as	“winners”	of	globalisation	(i.e.,	young,	middle-class,	university	graduates)	are	now	are	facing
increased	precarity	in	the	job	market,	the	prospect	of	bullshit	jobs,	growing	personal	debt,	and	poverty.
What	role	for	social	policy?
In	1997,	European	social	scientists	signed	the	Amsterdam	declaration	on	social	quality	of	Europe	and	arguing	for	the
importance	of	creating	a	social	policy	that	has	its	own	independent	rationale	and	legitimacy	so	as	to	counterbalance
the	dominance	of	economic	and	monetary	policy	within	the	EU.	Yet	little	has	been	done	since	then	to	enhance	social
quality	and	after	the	2008	financial	crisis;	existing	social	protections	and	programmes	in	the	UK	and	across	Europe
have	been	further	dismantled	in	the	name	of	cutting	the	deficit.
While	anti-austerity	groups	in	the	UK		have	raised	concerns	about	the	impact	of	austerity	policies	on	different	groups,
highlighted	alternatives	to	austerity	(e.g.,	cracking	down	on	tax	evasion),	and	demanded	the	reversals	of	the	cuts	and
the	raising	of	fees	(e.g.,	in	higher	education),	the	government	has	yet	to	substantively	change	course.	Despite	the
claims	of	Leave	campaigners,	more	money	has	not	been	going	into	the	NHS,	or	other	vital	social	services	and
programmes	(e.g.,		adult	social	care,	social	housing,	and	the	Sure	Start	early	childhood	centres)	and	there	is
little	evidence	that	this	will	change	once	Britain	finally	exits	the	EU.
In	the	absence	of	the	state	in	the	context	of	social	welfare,	some	argue	that	communities	and	voluntary	organisations
can	and	should	step	into	the	gap,	whether	or	not	this	happens	depends	on	the	community	and	its	access	to
resources.	More	importantly,	we	need	to	move	away	from	a	rosy	view	of	community	as	it	is	not	always	progressive
actors	who	move	in	to	fill	the	gaps	and	needs	of	populations	who	feel	left	behind.	Emerging	evidence	from	Britain,
Greece,	and	Italy	demonstrates	how	right-wing	movements	and	fascist	political	parties	(e.g.,	the	British	National
Party,	CasaPound	in	Italy	and	Golden	Dawn	in	Greece)	are	using	social	welfare	delivery,	including	food	banks	and
free	medical	services,	to	win	the	hearts,	minds,	and	votes	of	those	who	are	suffering	from	growing	poverty	and
precarity.
Jeremy	Corbyn’s	election	as	Labour	party	leader	and	his	explicit	anti-neoliberal	stance	has	revitalized	many	on	the
left,	yet	he	faces	challenges	from	the	Conservatives	as	well	as	those	in	his	own	party.		Moreover,	like	Bernie
Sanders	in	the	US,	Corbyn	is	often	accused	of	promoting	a	type	of	left	or	socialist	populism,	which	critics	argue	lacks
fiscal	constraint	and	is	anti-business.	It	remains	difficult	to	challenge	the	neoliberal	status	quo,	what	some	call	the
TINA	[there	is	no	alternative]	position.
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Today,	the	grievances	that	initially	brought	people	into	the	streets	in	protest	and	led	to	the	victory	of	Brexit,	have	not
been	resolved	and	in	some	instances,	they	have	been	exacerbated	and	the	neoliberal	model	remains	vibrant.	Rather
than	writing	off	those	with	grievances	as	the	losers	and	the	left-behind	as	angry	victims,	a	more	robust	and
empirically	grounded	analysis	is	required	to	understand	the	complex	political	reconfigurations	and	shifting	alliances
which	have	contributed	to	Brexit.	This,	in	turn,	can	inform	our	thinking	of	how	social	policy	can	mitigate	social
conflicts	and	advance	greater	social	justice	and	cohesion.		If	nothing	is	done	to	recognize	and	address	the	social	and
economic	drivers	which	contribute	to	rising	discontent,	populist	politicians	from	Trump	to	Farage	will	continue	to	tap
into	the	anger	by	creating	a	divisive	politics	of	us	versus	them.	And	those	who	are	suffering	from	poverty,
un(under)employment,	precarity,	lack	of	affordable	housing,	and	debt	will	not	be	any	better	off.
This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of		LSE	Brexit	or	the	London	School	of	Economics.	
Armine	Ishkanian	is	Associate	Professor	in	the	Department	of	Social	Policy	and	the	Programme	Director	of	the	MSc
in	International	Social	and	Public	Policy.	Twitter:	@Armish15	
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